Pascal’s Dilemma of Faith | Psychology of Today

Faith is supported by occasional betrayal. – Hoja at the Mosque

After returning to Catholicism, Blaze Pascal proposed a bet that was famous for his masterpieces thought (Think), take a mere paragraph to do it. Pascal took a different route, as he could not prove the existence of God. This was to be a milestone in the development of modern decision theory. Pascal reasoned that humans choose to believe in God or not. When God exists, belief brings infinite bliss to the afterlife, while mistrust causes infinite pain. In the absence of God, believers are only a little worse in earthly life, due to personal piety and the finite sacrifices needed for the church’s demands. Faced with the infinite bliss of the afterlife and the choices of limited sacrifice (with belief), limited pain and limited joy (distrust), Pascal argued that the choice to believe is rational and persuasive. That’s certainly true. As I suggested in a previous post, bets are rarely decided problem that’s why right Choices are set to inevitably (Krueger, 2011).

Many other criticisms of betting have been proposed (Hajek, 2008). To note those two, first there is the problem of multiple gods. For Pascal, only the Catholic version of God was played, but will he reward his belief in Akaman, the indigenous sky god of the Canary Islands? Another question is the psychological question of whether beliefs are freely chosen and true. If Pascal declared faith in God for reasons of his existence, then his friend Fermato’s declaration of faith was merely a tactical move to secure a desired desert, whereas his declaration of faith in God for reasons of his existence. How does God see it?

My interest in this post is to remake Pascal’s bet as a strategic dilemma between two reasonable agents. God and man. What happens if God, like a man, gives him room to supplement his heart and allows him to act like a strategically thought player in the two-agent dilemma? In the so-called experimental game (Evans & Krueger, 2009), I proposed to cast humans as trustees and gods as trustees (Krueger, 2025). Now God can reward or punish faithful trusts, but he will not punish those who are incredible. This constraint can confuse the clergy, but I would like to explain the perspective of the game theorist.

Those with Pascal’s mindset may want to ask if they love eternal bliss than eternity punishmentand they must question the way in which God thinks about the possibility that faith (i.e. trust) may reward faith (i.e. trust). Thus, trust games are more psychologically more interesting, a more interesting paradigm for the matter of faith, Pascal’s stake, and all uncertainties are defined after the person makes an orthodox choice.

Under the assumption that God exists, consider a third perspective that both him and humans have preferences over the four possible outcomes obtained from the intersection of their strategic preferences. By doing so, we can follow it Theory of movement (Brams, 1993). This simply asks you to make a reasonable assumption about the priority ranking of two agents. The rest is easy. Each player has two strategy options. Pascal can worship or ignore God, and God can care for the poor man or ignore him in neglect. Note that the issue of God’s existence is not part of this game.

The Matrix below shows us as a human being Pascal, as a player in the column, and as a column player. Their preferences are shown in blue (Pascal) and red (God), with more numbers showing more desirable results. Pascal’s preference can be summarised by saying that God likes to suit God’s strategy and that he tries to avoid the worst (i.e., use Minimax) heuristic). Rather, he wants to worship a caring God and ignore the lazy. God wants to be worshiped by his side, but he also wants to avoid the responsibility of giving rewards and punishments. His dominant strategy is to do nothing. Whichever strategy Pascal chooses, God prefers not to care.

When these preferences are accepted as general knowledge, Pascal recognizes his most desirable outcome, and is rewarded by God for his faith, and is out of reach, but God realizes that he cannot worship him without doing anything. Considering these conditions, Theory of movement (and traditional Game Theory), Pascal and God predict that they will find themselves in the states that do nothing (surrounded by greenery). This situation reflects the situation of the dysto. The dyst does not invest in religious beliefs or practices, and does not deny God’s existence, and God does not care. This result is equilibrium, as neither player can find a better outcome with a unilateral switch strategy.

Likes can be contested, as always in such thought experiments. There’s no need to think that everyone needs to have the same preference. But what is important is that the set of preferences being investigated maintains the belief dilemma. For example, if we assume that both Pascal and God prefer the combination of worship and compassion the most, find the combination of neglect and lazy while still finding out what is unattractive. Such a switch to non-inflammatory can be achieved by simply assuming that God prefers the work of compassion that no matter what man does, he does nothing. The solution to such a “game” is trivial. You may be happy with those who have already decided on their faith and the interests of God, as Pascal did, but it would seem rather like that rationalization.

To use another example for the effect of preference changes, consider what happens when ranks 2 and 3 of each player are switched, as shown in the matrix below.

Equilibrium results are achieved when Pascal worships God, but God remains indifferent. This is the best result for God, the second best result for Pascal, and Pareto efficient. In other words, it cannot be improved. Alas, Pascal, a human, doesn’t get what he wants most.